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Abstract Mutual fund advisers either expense the cost of research and other services or pay for 
them with soft dollars. This study is the first to use actual soft dollar and total brokerage 
commission figures for a large number of funds and to examine how soft dollars are linked to 
mutual fund governance. Employing a survivorship bias-free sample of actively managed US 
mutual funds, we find that higher soft dollar and total brokerage commissions are associated with 
higher advisory fees but not with higher risk-adjusted fund returns. These findings suggest that 
mutual fund shareholders, on average, do not benefit from the research and the information 
supplied by third parties such as brokers. We also find that larger and more highly compensated 
boards are associated with lower advisory fees. Larger boards are also associated with slightly 
lower turnover. The median tenure of board directors is negatively correlated with soft dollar 
commissions and turnover, but not correlated with total brokerage commissions or the cost of 
turning over a portfolio. Higher proportions of directors with a finance background are 
associated with higher advisory fees, brokerage commissions, and turnover costs. These 
associations might indicate greater agency costs. 
 
 
Keywords Mutual funds • Soft dollars • Mutual fund fees • Mutual fund performance • 
Mutual fund governance 
 




 Investing in financial assets via intermediaries such as mutual funds can provide investors with 
the diversification they want. But, because the mutual fund shareholders are assessed an annual 
expense ratio for the professional management of their portfolios, this diversification can be 
costly. Further, funds can also charge separate sales or distribution charges (front- and back-end 
loads, 12b-1 fees). These costs are disclosed prominently in the funds’ prospectuses and their 
reports to the shareholders. In addition, the shareholders pay the cost of brokerage commissions 
incurred by the fund; commissions are a major category of expenses but are not part of the 
reported expense ratio.1 
The legal fiduciary duty of the mutual funds’ advisers as defined by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) includes but is not limited to the requirement to seek the best 
transaction execution. In addition to execution, the brokers can provide other services to the 
funds’ advisers, such as the sales of the funds’ shares, investment research and statistical 
information, and administrative services. Funds can produce these services in-house or pay third 
parties outright, thus including their cost in the expense ratio. Alternatively, the funds can pay 
brokers for these services by bundling the costs with the execution commissions and then 
deducting these bundled commissions directly from the fund’s assets, which bypasses the 
expense ratio. Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows a “safe harbor” that 
 
1 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Report on mutual fund fees and expenses (2000) explains it as the 
absence of a widely accepted approach to measure spread costs. Including trade commissions in the expense ratio 
can be misleading if brokers charging higher commissions have better execution that results in lower spread costs. 
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permits advisers to transfer a premium to brokers for these additional services. This section also 
requires advisers to disclose such arrangements. The disclosure of these bundled soft dollar 
commissions is more opaque than expensing the cost of non-execution services. Edelen et al. 
(2012) argue that the lack of visibility of soft dollar commissions can exacerbate agency conflicts 
and result in less efficient fund operations. They suggest that funds engage in the opaque 
disclosure of costs because such disclosures are associated with a less negative impact on their 
flows. The SEC’s Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices under Section 28(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (2006) states: 
Use of client commissions to pay for research and brokerage services presents money managers 
with significant conflicts of interest, and may give incentives for managers to disregard their best 
execution obligations when directing orders to obtain client commission services as well as to 
trade client securities inappropriately in order to earn credits for client commission services. 
  
The funds’ managers can trade excessively to generate a target volume of commission payments 
that reduces the efficiency of operations (Edelen et al. 2012). The opaqueness of soft dollar 
arrangements makes them hard to monitor not only by the shareholders but also by the boards, 
which potentially leads to governance inefficiencies. 
Purchasing additional services with soft dollars can result in two benefits to the fund’s 
shareholders: (i) higher risk-adjusted returns on their portfolios as a result of the obtained 
research and information, and (ii) lower advisory fees because the cost of research and other 
additional services that otherwise would be part of the total expense ratio is part of the brokerage 
commissions. Not consistently achieving at least one of these benefits indicates that the soft 
dollar arrangements, on average, lead to a reduction in the shareholders’ wealth.  
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Numerous studies examine the performance of mutual funds (e.g., Carhart 1997; Chen et 
al. 2004; Daniel et al. 1997) and their expenses, fees, and contracts (e.g., Bergstresser et al. 2009; 
Deli 2002; Gao and Livingston 2008; Livingston and O’Neal 1996; Kuhnen 2009; Luo 2002). 
Relatively few studies directly examine the determinants and the use of soft dollars by mutual 
funds (e.g., Conrad et al. 2001; Edelen et al. 2012; Livingston and O’Neal 1996), probably due to 
lack of soft dollar data or the difficulty in retrieving such data.  
We examine the relations between the use of soft dollar arrangements and (i) the fund, 
contract environment, and the brokers’ participation characteristics; (ii) the funds’ governance 
(characteristics of the funds’ boards); and (iii) the potential benefits to shareholders. We use 
hand-collected soft dollar and total brokerage commission data to create a survivorship bias-free 
sample of 391 actively managed US-based equity mutual funds from 1999 through 2003. To our 
knowledge, this study is the first one that uses actual (not estimated) soft dollar commission 
amounts at the fund level for a large number of mutual funds and that examines soft dollar use in 
the context of mutual fund governance.  
We find that the use of soft dollars varies widely across funds. This variation implies that 
using actual soft dollar amounts is likely to increase the robustness of the results. We find that 
funds with higher soft dollar commissions do not have better risk-adjusted performance but 
charge higher advisory fees. Therefore, fund shareholders, on average, do not benefit from soft 
dollar arrangements. The funds with larger and more highly compensated boards tend to have 
lower advisory fees. The boards with a longer median tenure of directors are associated with 
lower soft dollar fees and slightly lower turnover. A proportion of directors with a finance 
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background on the fund’s board is positively correlated with total brokerage commissions and 
the cost of turning over a portfolio. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the use and disclosure of soft dollar 
arrangements by mutual funds. In Section 3, we discuss the potential impact of soft dollar 
arrangements on the shareholders’ wealth and the potential determinants of soft dollar use. In 
Section 4, we describe the data and methods. We report and discuss the empirical results in 
Section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
2 Soft dollar use and disclosure by mutual funds 
The use of soft dollars is common if not an industry norm. Greenwich Associates reported in 
1996 that 71% of the total transaction executions involved some form of soft dollar arrangement 
(Wirth 1997). Livingston and O’Neal (1996) suggest that a substantial amount of brokerage 
commissions are payments for research services rather than for execution. Goldstein et al. (2009) 
suggest that the persistence of high per-share trade commissions in an era of increased 
competition from discount brokers reflects the bundling of premium services rather than specific 
characteristics of the trade. The SEC (1998) estimates that soft dollar commissions for research 
products add up to 30–50% of the total brokerage expenses, reaching approximately $1.4 billion 
in 1998. Conrad et al. (2001) estimate that an average proportion of the soft dollar commissions 
paid for research is 60%. Our initial screening of equity mutual funds discloses that two thirds of 
the funds report the adoption of soft dollar arrangements.    
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Because a fund’s shareholders ultimately pay the brokerage fees, critics argue that soft 
dollars represent a breach of loyalty in which the fund’s advisers unjustly enrich themselves by 
shifting the research bill to investors. Practitioners (e.g., Ambachtsheer 1993; Blume 1993; 
Bogle 2009) generally have a negative opinion of soft dollar practices. Bogle (2009) considers 
the use of soft dollars for marketing a waste of the shareholders’ assets. Blume (1993) finds that 
soft dollar arrangements often lead institutional managers to use brokers that they ordinarily 
would not use. On the other hand, Horan and Johnsen (2008) hypothesize that by paying the 
adviser’s research bill up-front, the broker posts a quality-assuring performance bond that 
efficiently subsidizes the adviser’s investment research.2 Also, Johnsen (2009) argues that soft 
dollars are an innovative and efficient form of economic organization that benefits the funds’ 
investors. 
The SEC requires mutual funds to supply investors with the fund’s prospectus and on 
request, the Statement of Additional Information (SAI). The prospectus reports the total expense 
ratio (which does not include brokerage commissions), front-end and back-end loads, and 12b-1 
fees (while they are part of the expense ratio, they also must be reported separately). The SAI 
reports brokerage commissions. The existence of soft dollar commissions, but not their amount, 
must be disclosed. There is no specific format for disclosure. When disclosed, a typical statement 
on the soft dollar commissions and related transactions reads as follows: “For the fiscal year 
 
2This is because, according to Horan and Johnsen (2008), an institutional broker typically provides a fund’s manager 
with credits up-front to pay a specific dollar amount of the manager’s research bill to independent vendors. In 
exchange, the manager promises to send the broker a specific amount of future trades at premium commission rates. 
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ended June 30, 2002, the Funds directed the following amount of transactions and paid the 
following brokerage commissions to brokers who provided research services in connection with 
such transactions.” For unsophisticated investors, the effect of brokerage commissions and 
turnover on the net asset value (NAV) and returns might not be clear. Barber et al. (2005) show 
that investors pay more attention to more “visible” or up-front fees such as front-end loads than 
to the funds’ operating expenses. The SAI might be hard to obtain (Gao and Livingstone 2008), 
and in most cases the information on soft dollar commissions is not disclosed clearly and 
prominently. The funds also supply N-SAR reports to the SEC on a semiannual basis. The 
format of the N-SAR reports, which contain large amounts of information, is not retail investor 
friendly. The Carlin (2009) model suggests that funds might have an incentive to decrease the 
transparency of payments and induce complexity because it prevents some retail consumers from 
obtaining knowledge about market prices. The SEC (1998) reports that many advisors do not 
provide sufficient information to enable investors to understand their soft dollar policies and 
practices. 
Our sample period ends in 2003; it is fairly old. However, there appears to be little need 
for an update since not much has changed in the funds’ brokerage expenses and soft dollar 
practices between then and now.3 A report by Woodbine Associates (2012) finds that the practice 
of bundling commissions remains deeply ingrained in the industry despite the investors’ calls for 
 
3 Firms are rarely punished by regulators for abusing soft dollar practices. The most recent occurrence is an 
$813,000 fine imposed by the SEC on a New York-based firm Instinet on December 26, 2013 for inappropriate use 
of soft dollars (SEC 2013). 
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transparency and cost savings. M. Samelson, the author of the report, is critical of the practice 
and states in his discussion of the report: 
Abolishing soft dollar arrangements would lead to a far more efficient and transparent 
environment and remove many conflicts of interest between money managers and their clients. It 
would also likely lead to immediate changes in business practices and industry structure.  
 
 
3 Soft dollars: potential determinants and impact on shareholder wealth 
3.1 Potential benefits of soft dollars to shareholders   
If additional services and research help improve portfolio management, we should observe a 
positive relation between soft dollar commissions and the funds’ performance. The information 
obtained through soft dollar arrangements is less likely to be embedded in the prices of traders 
that do not have that information. The informed investors might profit more from their 
information if less of it is incorporated into the prices by uninformed investors (Livne and 
Trueman 2002). Hence, the fund might be motivated to trade more. Moreover, Brennan and 
Chordia (1993) argue that high-quality information can also result in higher revenue to the 
broker as the seller of the information. However, the quality of research and other services 
obtained under soft dollar arrangements is not necessarily homogeneous, so the impact of soft 
dollar use is likely to vary across brokers. Brennan and Chordia (1993) suggest that the amount 
of trading done by the information purchaser could be a proxy for the quality of information. 
Thus, advisers that obtain what they believe is high quality information might engage in more 
transactions per dollar of soft commissions and achieve better gross performance. On the other 
hand, Edelen et al. (2012) suggest that funds might engage in excessive (superfluous) trading to 
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generate the target level of commission payments, thus wasting shareholders’ money. In this 
case, higher soft dollar commissions would be associated with higher turnover and poorer 
performance.  
The second potential benefit of soft dollar arrangements to the shareholders is lower 
advisory fees because the cost of research is paid as part of the brokerage commissions instead. 
However, Livingston and O’Neal (1996) find no trade-off between aggregate brokerage 
commissions per trade and the total expense ratio and suggest that the funds’ shareholders do not 
benefit from soft dollar arrangements through a reduction in advisory fees. Therefore, higher soft 
dollar commissions are not necessarily associated with lower advisory fees. A negative (positive 
or no) relation between soft dollar commissions and advisory fees would indicate that the 
shareholders do (do not) benefit from a decrease in advisory fees as the soft dollar commissions 
increase.  
Deli (2002) finds that the advisory fee is directly related to the fund’s turnover and 
inversely related to the fund’s size and the adviser’s size. In addition, to capture the effect of 
competition between different investment objectives, we control for the concentration of assets 
within each objective.  
 
3.2 Potential determinants of soft dollar arrangements 
3.2.1 Considerations for the broker’s selection 
The management of brokerage services starts with the determination of the broker’s 
participation. If choosing brokers is a strategic decision, then the use of soft dollars should reflect 
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the adviser’s ex ante considerations on the participation. The mutual funds in the United States 
disclose which of the following services they consider when selecting brokers: (1) sales of the 
fund’s shares, (2) receipt of investment research and statistical information, (3) receipt of 
quotations for portfolio valuations, (4) ability to execute portfolio transactions to obtain the best 
price and execution, and (5) receipt of telephone line and wire services.  
These five services fall into four categories: (1) distribution, (2) research, (3 and 5) 
administrative, and (4) transaction execution. A broker’s service that is selected mostly “to 
obtain the best price and execution” should be associated with lower brokerage commissions and 
less soft dollar use. However, almost all of the funds in our sample report it as one of the 
considerations for the broker’s participation. This finding is not surprising because obtaining the 
best execution for clients is part of the fiduciary duty of investment companies. We hypothesize 
that the soft dollar use should be higher if the “receipt of investment research and statistical 
information” is a consideration for the broker’s selection. Further, the adviser might choose 
brokers based on their ability to market the fund’s shares.4 
3.2.2 Brokers and contract environment characteristics  
Concentration of the brokers. The fewer brokers the fund uses, the more concentrated the supply 
of brokerage services. Goldstein et al. (2009) show that brokerage commission patterns are 
consistent with long-term agreements between the funds’ advisers and brokers, where an adviser 
 
4A SEC ruling in December 2004 prohibited the use of commission bundling to pay for distribution expenditures. 
Our sample ends in 2003. Funds are still allowed to charge 12b-1 fees for distribution. The 12b-1 fee is part of a 
fund’s expense ratio but it is also reported separately.    
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directs a target level of order flow to a broker as payment for premium services such as research 
and share distribution. Thus, if the adviser chooses brokers for their premium services, a more 
concentrated supply of services would be associated with higher commissions. If, on the other 
hand, the adviser chooses brokers to minimize the cost of brokerage services, a more 
concentrated supply of services would be associated with lower total brokerage commissions.  
Institutional relations with the brokers. The general fiduciary duty is imposed on 
investment advisers by Section 206 of the Investment Adviser Act. An investment adviser should 
use an affiliated broker only if the broker can provide the best execution. In addition to the 
commissions for transaction executions and soft dollar arrangements, the funds can transfer rent 
to brokers as part of the sales loads and 12b-1 fees, especially if the broker is part of their sales 
force. If these rent transfers exist, the broker can provide transaction execution and additional 
services at lower costs. Christoffersen et al. (2013) find that a fund’s future performance 
decreases as the brokers’ payments from the load increase, especially for unaffiliated brokers. A 
reverse rent transfer takes place when the broker has an arrangement to return or credit part of 
the commissions or profits back to the fund’s adviser. This reverse rent transfer might induce the 
adviser to use more soft dollars. We control in our tests for the broker’s affiliation, the sales 
loads and 12b-1 fees received by the brokers, and the arrangements to credit part of the 
commissions or profits back to the adviser.  
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3.2.3 Fund and board characteristics 
Size, turnover, and investment objectives. First, larger funds obtain lower commissions as a 
percent of total assets because the fixed component of commissions is spread over a larger 
amount of assets. Second, higher turnover could be a sign of aggressive trading, possibly induced 
by the information paid for by the soft dollars. Third, the funds with certain investment 
objectives might be more likely to demand or rely on external research. For example, Livingston 
and O’Neal (1996) suggest that international funds have higher brokerage expenses because they 
invest in stocks that are relatively difficult to research. We use investment objective fixed effects 
in our regressions to control for these differences. 
Fund Governance. The decision to use soft dollar arrangements are made by the fund’s 
adviser and are overseen by the board. Hypothetically, soft dollar arrangements should be 
evaluated by the fund’s board based on two criteria. First, are they associated with improved 
risk-adjusted performance? Second, does the advisory fee decrease proportionally to the cost of 
the outsourced management services? Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) suggest that better 
governance might bring fees more in line with the performance. However, it is fairly common 
for advisers to supply poorly detailed information regarding the types of services obtained with 
soft dollars (SEC 1998). The opaqueness of soft dollar arrangements can increase the complexity 
of the board’s task.  
There is a great deal of literature that studies the relations between the mutual funds’ 
expenses and governance. The evidence regarding the board’s size and governance is mixed. 
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Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest that funds with larger boards have higher total fees. They also 
argue that more independent boards are better watchdogs. Baker and Gompers (2003) and 
Kuhnen (2009) suggest that larger boards have higher monitoring potential. Moreover, the 
characteristics of individual board members can affect the board’s governing abilities. These 
characteristics (e.g., background, independence, outside directorships, or compensation) are not 
necessarily independent because new board members emerge from the pool of candidates 
nominated by current board members.  
The relation between the board members’ tenure and fund governance is not obvious a 
priori. On the one hand, the funds can benefit from the experience of members who have been on 
the board for a long time. On the other hand, the selection process could be influenced by the 
adviser. Xie et al. (2003) suggest that independent directors with finance backgrounds are better 
monitors of earnings management. Having an outside directorship could be interpreted as a 
signal of high quality in the directors (Booth and Deli 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999). If a 
director collects income from other directorships, it might reduce the probability of aligning the 
director’s and the adviser’s interests through increased compensation. The literature provides 
mixed evidence about the effect of compensation on the oversight of independent directors. A 
positive relation between compensation and advisory fees could signal the superior abilities of 
directors that deserve higher compensation, but it also could be an attempt to create an incentive 
to align the independent directors’ interests with the adviser’s.5  
 
5 See Tufano and Sevick (1997), Vafeas (1999), Perry (2000), Ryan and Wiggins (2004). 
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4 Data and methodology 
For the period from 1999 through 2003, we randomly select 432 actively managed equity, 
convertible, or balanced funds from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database 
that report using soft dollars in at least one year during the study period.6,7 After excluding 
Vanguard funds and apparent errors, the sample is reduced to 391 funds from 70 families that are 
managed by over 120 different advisers.8 Many of these funds are very small. Accordingly, we 
run empirical tests on all of the funds in the sample as well as on the funds with total net assets in 
excess of $50 million (304 funds).  
This sample is representative of the US equity mutual fund universe during the study 
period. The CRSP database averaged around 4,000 funds in the objectives that we are 
examining. The database averaged 542 families per year from 1999 to 2003, and the total net 
assets of all of the funds (non-index equity, convertible, and balanced funds) averaged $6.06 
trillion ($2.76 trillion) per year in that period. Our sample covers around 10% of both the funds 
and the net assets of the total funds.9  The average advisory fee of the total mutual funds was 
 
6 It is possible that the advisers who are more successful at using the services obtained through the soft dollar 
arrangements are more likely to disclose amounts of bundled commissions in addition to their existence. To 
determine whether the lack of uniform disclosure leads to selection bias, we conduct the Heckman sample selection 
bias test at the initial screening stage with 106 funds, 31 of which do not disclose the information. The test fails to 
reject the null of no selection bias and is robust to treating the funds that report zero soft dollar commissions as 
having no soft dollar arrangements. Including them into the sample under the assumption that they do not use soft 
dollar arrangements does not qualitatively affect the results.  
7 When we exclude convertible and balanced funds from the analyses, the results are qualitatively the same. 
8 Vanguard funds did not use soft dollars for research and other services during the sample period. 
9The CRSP Mutual Fund Database tracked share classes but not funds before 2004. According to the 2013 
Investment Company Institute Fact Book (2013), there were an average of 4,471 actively managed equity funds per 
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about 74 basis points, compared to 78 basis points in our sample. The proportions of funds in 
each investment objective and the proportion of dead funds in the sample match those in the 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database. 
Some of the variables are reported at the share-class level (e.g., total net assets, loads and 
12b-1 fees, returns) while others (e.g., advisory fee, commissions, and turnover) are at the fund 
level.10 Thus, we need to aggregate the former to the fund level. We do this aggregation by 
applying the shares’ class weights based on each class’s total net assets at the beginning of a year 
(a month for the variables reported monthly, such as returns and total net assets). The year 1999 
was picked as the first year because less than a half of the randomly selected funds disclosed the 
amounts of soft dollar commissions prior to 1999. The sample includes 40 fund-years in which 
zero soft dollar commissions are explicitly reported. 11,12  
The information about soft dollar commissions, total brokerage commissions, and board 
members is collected from the funds’ SAIs. The rest of the data are collected from the funds’ N-
SARs.  
 
year from 1999 to 2003 (4,966 including hybrid funds), with average net assets of $791 million ($788 million 
including hybrid funds). The average net assets per fund is $724 million in our sample.  
10 The advisory fee often has a “stacked” structure: e.g., the advisory fee may be 1% for the first $10mln of assets 
under management, 0.75% for the next $90mln in assets (between $10 million and $100 million), and 0.5% for 
assets above $100mln. In such cases we compute the advisory fee based on the total net assets at the beginning of 
the year. In this example, if these assets were $200 million at the beginning of the year, the weighted advisory fee is 
(10mln*0.01 + 90mln*0.0075 + $100mln*0.005)/200mln, or 0.638%. 
11 Excluding these 40 zero soft dollar fund-years from the sample does not change the results. 
12 Large fund families such as Fidelity are likely to appear more frequently in the sample set. However, because a 
fund’s family with a higher weight in the industry is more likely to influence the industry norms, this characteristic 
of a sample is representative of the whole population of actively managed equity mutual funds. 
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Livingston and O’Neal (1996) note that sells are likely to be higher than buys at times of 
high redemptions. Likewise, buys are likely to exceed sells at times of asset inflows. Therefore, 
the net turnover reported in Form N-SAR understates the total assets traded. We calculate the 
turnover as the sum of the purchases and sales reported in the N-SAR divided by the fund’s 
weighted average assets over a year.13 
Advisers report the total amount of brokerage commissions as well as the amounts paid to 
the top ten brokers. We estimate the broker concentration by computing the non-normalized 
Herfindahl index of the brokerage commissions paid by the fund’s management to the top ten 
brokers. Two major alternative rent transfers to brokers and dealers are front-end loads and 12b-
1 fees. Not all front-end loads and 12b-1 fees are received by the brokers. We use the actual 
amounts paid to brokers. Further, we include the fund’s and the board’s characteristics that we 
discussed in the previous section to shed light on the role the funds’ boards play in soft dollar 
arrangements. The literature mostly suggests that larger boards and longer tenured members are 
better watchdogs. 
We start by studying the link between the different measures of the investing costs and 
the fund’s performance by running the following unbalanced panel regression with White’s 
 
13 Funds with high turnover also bear the market impact cost of transactions in addition to brokerage commissions. 
However, Berkowitz et al. (1988) argue that the market impact costs are small relative to commissions and conclude 
that there is no economic trade-off between the market impact costs and commissions. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) 
suggest no correlation between the market impact costs and brokerage commissions. Thus, following Livingston and 
O’Neal’s (1996), we do not control for the market impact cost. 
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period standard errors and covariance and Wallace and Hussain’s estimator of component 
variances: 
FFARi,t = β0 + β1Costi,t + β2Ln(FundSizei,t-1) +  εi,t        (1)  
The FFAR (the four-factor adjusted return) is the annualized alpha from the estimation of the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model for each fund-year by using 12 monthly observations. The 
Carhart model captures the fund’s before-fees risk-adjusted return.14 The Cost is represented by 
one of the following variables that measure the trading costs of the investors:  
(i) soft dollar use (SDU) = soft dollar commissions divided by the total brokerage 
commissions for fund i in year t, in %; 
(ii) soft dollar fee (SoftFee) = soft dollar commissions divided by net weighted average 
assets of fund i in year t, in basis points; 
(iii) brokerage fee (BrkFee) = total brokerage commissions divided by net weighted 
average assets of the fund for fund i in year t, in basis points;  
(iv) turnover (Turn)  computed as the sum of purchases and sales divided by net weighted 
average assets; or  
(v) brokerage commissions for turning over the fund portfolio once (TurnCost) computed 
as BrkFee divided by Turn, in basis points.  
 
14 If a fund has multiple share classes, a weighted average monthly return is computed based on the weights of 
different share classes at the beginning of each month. 
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The FundSize is the average of the 12 monthly net asset figures in thousands of dollars. We 
include TurnCost following Carhart (1997). We lag the log of the fund’s size one year to avoid a 
spurious correlation. The objective and the year fixed effects are included.15,16 
To investigate whether shareholders benefit from a reduction in advisory fees when soft 
dollars or other direct or indirect investing costs increase, we use the following model: 
AdvFeei,t = β0 + β1Costi,t + β2Ln(FundSizei,t)+  β3Ln(AdvSizei,t) +β4Ln(Acctsi,t) 
 + β5Reimbi,t + β6ObjConcntri,t +β7Indepi,t + β8Seatsi,t + β9MedTenurei,t  + β10Fini,t 
+ β11OtherDiri,t + β12Compensi,t-1  + εi,t         (2) 
Along with the variables defined previously, we add the following:  
AdvFeei,t  = dollar amount of gross advisory fee paid by fund i in year t divided by the 
weighted average assets of fund i in year t, in basis points; 
AdvSizei,t  = adviser’s size, measured as the total assets of funds in the CRSP database 
managed by the same adviser, in millions of dollars; 
Acctsi,t = number of shareholder accounts with the fund; 
Reimbi,t = dollar amount of the (partial) reimbursement of expenses by the fund’s adviser 
to shareholders divided by the fund’s total size (total net assets), in basis points; 
 
15 We also ran the regression with the variable SoftPerTri,t, defined as the log of the ratio of the dollar amount of  
transactions involving soft dollars to the soft dollar commissions – a control for the quality of information suggested 
by Brennan and Chordia (1993). A higher ratio might be suggestive of better information. This variables’ estimated 
coefficient is not significant, and its inclusion does not affect the results qualitatively. However, including it results 
in “losing” 104 funds that do not report the amount of transactions involving soft dollars. Accordingly, we do not 
use this variable. 
16 Including family fixed effects for all 70 families would dramatically reduce the regression’s power, especially 
given that we already use the objective and year fixed effects (some families are represented by one or very few 
funds in our sample). When we add dummy variables for the 11 most highly represented families (accounting for 
191 funds, about a half of our sample), the results do not change notably. Therefore, we do not include family fixed 
effects in the final set of regressions. 
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ObjConcntri,t = normalized Herfindahl index of the fund’s objective calculated following 
the Luo (2002) method;17 
Indepi,t  = percentage of board directors considered independent; 
Seatsi,t  = number of seats on the board of directors; 
MedTenurei,t   =    median tenure of the board’s directors; 
Fini,t       =    percentage of directors with finance backgrounds; 
OtherDiri,t       =    percentage of directors with other directorships; 
Compensi,t-1     =    average fund director compensation in the previous year, in thousands of 
dollars. 
The model includes the standard fund-specific control variables of the adviser’s and the fund’s 
sizes, as well as the governance variables that the literature suggests are related to the advisory 
fees, such as the board’s size and independence. We also control for (i) the number of accounts 
because the administrative cost is a significant portion of the advisory fee, (ii) the reimbursement 
rate because the ex post reimbursements might imply ex ante higher advisory fees, and (iii) the 
objective concentration as a proxy for competition within the fund’s objective. We add the 
boards’ characteristics to test if and how governance is related to the advisory fees.18,19 The year 
and objective fixed effects are included.  
 
17 The normalized Herfindahl index characterizes the relative competitiveness in an investment objective to which 
the fund belongs compared to the case where net assets are equally distributed among all funds within the objective. 
We repeat the tests without normalizing the Herfindahl index; the results are qualitatively the same. 
18 To be classified as a director with a finance background, one either must have had a finance occupation in the past 
or is currently occupied in the finance industry (the latter group constitutes the majority of such directors). Since 
directors often sit on the boards of many funds offered by the same sponsor, the variable OtherDir only considers 
directorships outside of the fund’s sponsor (in our sample, all of them also happen to be outside of the mutual fund 
industry). The variable constructed in this manner captures the proportion of directors who do not depend only on 
one source of fees and potentially sends a signal about the board’s quality. 
19 Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest measures of excess director compensation. When we use excess compensation 
(either per seat or per director, following Tufano and Sevick’s (1997) Equations 1 and 2 on p.338 in their paper) in 
place of unadjusted compensation, it is not significant in the regressions. Perhaps directors are concerned more 
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Further, we test the links between the costs of investing and the characteristics of the 
funds, the contracting environment, and the governance by estimating the following regression:  
Costi,t = β0 + β1Researchi,t + β2Salesi,t + β3AltCompi,t + β4BrConcntri,t +β5Affi,t + β6Credi,t  
+ β7Ln(FundSizei,t) + β8Ln(AdvSizei,t) +β9Ln(Acctsi,t) + β10Reimbi,t + β11ObjConcntri,t  
+ β12Turni,t + β13Indepi,t + β14Seatsi,t + β15MedTenurei,t  + β16Fini,t  
+ β17OtherDiri,t + β18Compensi,t-1 +  εi,t      (3) 
Along with the variables defined previously, we add the following: 
Researchi,t = one if the receipt of investment research and statistical information is a 
consideration for the broker’s participation; 
Salesi,t = one if the sale of the fund’s shares is a consideration for the broker’s 
participation;  
AltCompi,t = the proportion of total weighted assets received by the brokers or dealers as part 
of the total front-end load and 12b-1 fee, in basis points;20 
BrConctri,t = the fund’s brokerage service concentration measured by the Herfindahl index; 
Affi,t = one if any broker or dealer is affiliated with the adviser; 
Credi,t = one if there is an arrangement to return or credit part of the total commissions 
or profits by at least one broker to the fund’s adviser. 
This model also includes the objective and year fixed effects. For the regressions analyses, we 
winsorize all of the non-indicator variables except Fin and Reimb, which do not have much 
variation in the tails, at the 1% and 99% levels. 
  
 
about the potential loss of income from the fund’s sponsor (in case they oppose the fund’s policies and lose their 
seat) than how this income compares to the fees paid by other funds or sponsors. 
20 Decomposing alternative rent transfers into loads and 12b-1 fees does not affect the results.  
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5 Empirical results 
5.1 Univariate and bivariate analyses 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. On average, 45% of the total brokerage commissions 
are paid under soft dollar arrangements. This figure is consistent with the SEC’s (1998) estimate 
of soft dollar use. The total brokerage commissions are on average 41.9 basis points (0.42%) of a 
fund’s total assets of which 18.6 basis points are transferred as soft dollar commissions. For the 
subsample that excludes the smallest funds, the total and soft dollar commissions are 34.4 and 
17.7 basis points respectively. Both soft dollar use and commissions vary widely around the 
means. Thus, a fund with the mean size of $724 million in our sample transfers around $1.35 
million per year to its brokers under soft dollar arrangements ($1.73 million for the subsample of 
the larger funds, or 0.177% of $979 million). The average advisory fee is 78 basis points. The 
average turnover is 313% (244%) for all of the funds (the larger funds). On average, 75% of the 
board directors are considered independent, with the directors’ median tenure at six years. About 
a quarter of the directors have finance backgrounds, and 60% have at least one other 
directorship.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In 88.6% of the fund-years in our sample, the funds report that the receipt of investment 
research and statistical information influences their choice of brokers. In 32.2% of the fund-
years, the funds consider the sales of their shares in determining the broker’s participation. An 
affiliated broker or dealer is considered in 28.7% of the fund-years. In 29.8% of the fund-years, 
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an arrangement with at least one broker to return part of the commissions to the adviser is 
considered. 
Table 2 reports the correlations between the measure of performance (FFAR – the four-
factor model alpha) and the variables that in one way or another measure the investing costs of 
mutual funds (total and soft dollar commissions, soft dollar use, advisory fees, turnover, and 
turnover costs). We observe that larger funds tend to perform better and have lower 
commissions: the turnover and the investing costs (SoftFee, BrkFee, TurnCost, AdvFee) are 
negatively correlated with size and performance but the proportion of soft dollars in the 
commission structure (SDU) is weakly and positively correlated with size and performance. 
These correlations suggest that mutual fund shareholders, on average, do not benefit from soft 
dollar arrangements in the form of higher returns or lower advisory fees.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 provides a more detailed look into the relations between the same seven variables 
by sorting the fund-years with respect to each variable one at a time and reporting the means of 
the highest and lowest deciles for each variable. There are few differences between Panels A and 
B, so we refer mostly to Panel A.  
The first three rows inside the table compare the means for each variable corresponding 
to the fund-years in the bottom (first) and top (tenth) FFAR deciles. The fund-years in the bottom 
FFAR decile have a mean of -25.4% versus 26.5% for the top decile, with the difference being 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Further, we observe that the fund-years in the lowest 
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FFAR decile have the highest average SoftFee of 40.1bps (the decile rank is ten), and the fund-
years in the highest FFAR decile have the second highest average SoftFee of 26.7 bps (the decile 
rank is nine). The rest of the FFAR decile comparison shows that the fund-years with the best 
risk-adjusted performance are associated with fairly high total brokerage fees (the decile rank is 
8), highest SDU (10), average size (5), above average turnover (7), and advisory fees (6). 
When we rank the fund-years by SoftFee (the second three rows in the table), we observe 
that the lowest SoftFee decile is associated with the best adjusted performance (FFAR). The 
FFAR difference from the highest SoftFee decile is significant at the 1% level when the smallest 
funds are excluded (Panel B) but only marginally significant when all of the funds are retained 
(Panel A). The combination of the results reported in the first six rows of the table suggests that a 
minority of the funds in our sample are able to put soft dollars to good use and receive superior 
research from brokers or third parties (or simply have good luck in some years), while most 
funds with high soft dollar commissions perform poorly on a risk-adjusted basis.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In unreported tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the SoftFee does not Granger cause 
AdvFee (FFAR) at one, two, and three (one and two) lags. 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
5.2.1 Soft dollars and fund performance 
If services are acquired with soft dollars to improve the portfolio’s performance, the shareholders 
might benefit from higher risk-adjusted returns. Table 4 reports the output of Equation (1) – the 
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regressions of the alphas from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model on various measures of the 
investing costs of mutual funds and the control variables.21 The negative relation between 
SoftFee and the risk-adjusted performance suggests that the costs of the soft dollar arrangements 
exceed the benefits, and that the fund’s shareholders bear these incremental costs. The SoftFee’s 
estimated coefficient of -0.06 indicates that increasing the SoftFee by 0.01% (1 basis point, 
because SoftFee is in basis points) of total assets is associated with a 0.06% decline in the risk-
adjusted performance. However, because the SDU is not significant and the BrkFee is, it appears 
that the bundling or unbundling of the commissions is not as important as the amount of 
commissions paid relative to the fund’s size, turnover, and the turnover costs. This finding 
supports the studies that suggest that aggressive trading costs the shareholders more than it 
benefits them (e.g., Livingstone and O’Neal 1996).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our results suggest that most funds do not achieve persistent positive performance by 
using the information obtained through soft dollar arrangements, which is consistent with Conrad 
et al. (2001) and inconsistent with Horan and Johnsen (2008), who find that premium 
commissions that are paid by private money managers are positively related to the risk-adjusted 
performance. The additional costs associated with high turnover and the resulting high 
commissions, both bundled and unbundled, are not, on average, offset by better investment 
returns.   
 
21 Because we use the lag of the log of FundSize in Equation (1) to avoid a spurious correlation, the number of fund-
years is reduced. 
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When we use the CAPM’s alphas instead of the four-factor model’s alphas, the results 
are somewhat different. Among the key independent variables in the Table 4 regressions, the 
turnover is negative and significant for the regressions on the whole sample. The TurnCost is 
negative and significant for the sample of the larger funds, and the BrkFee is only marginally 
significant in both the entire sample and the subsample of the larger funds. Except for the size, 
all of the remaining coefficients are not significant. To test whether the bundled commissions are 
used more for advice on investing in securities loading up on the factors in the four-factor model, 
we examine the correlations between SoftFee and each of the factor betas. These correlations are 
low; the highest and the only statistically significant correlation coefficient is between SoftFee 
and the momentum beta at only 0.06, with a p-value of 0.035. Because the four-factor model 
remains the dominant one in the literature on the mutual funds’ performance, we retain the alpha 
of the four-factor model as the dependent variable in Equation 1. Whether we use the four-
factor’s or the market model’s alphas, the relation between the excess risk-adjusted return and 
the soft dollars (or other measures of investing costs) is not positive, which indicates that the 
mutual funds’ shareholders do not benefit from higher trade-related expenses. 
5.2.2 Soft dollars and advisory fees 
Table 5 shows the estimation outputs of Equation 2. The key result is that the higher soft dollar 
commissions, total brokerage commissions, and turnover are all associated with higher advisory 
fees. A ten basis point increase in the soft dollar commissions is associated with an advisory fee 
increase of 1.1 basis points. This result runs contrary to the idea that the shareholders who 
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surrender part of their wealth to soft dollar commissions should benefit from a reduction in the 
advisory fees.22 We cannot rule out that the information provided by the outside source could 
have higher quality. Nevertheless, our previous results suggest that the cost of this information 
tends to outweigh its benefits, and a high level of soft dollar commissions is in general not 
beneficial to the funds’ shareholders. The larger funds have lower advisory fees, while the funds 
with more accounts have higher fees, which is consistent with higher administrative costs.   
Three of the governance variables are significantly correlated with advisory fees. The 
association between the board’s size and the advisory fee is negative, which supports the 
findings of Baker and Gompers (2003) and Kuhnen (2009) and suggests that larger boards are 
better monitors. The boards with higher proportions of directors with finance backgrounds are 
associated with higher advisory fees, while more highly compensated boards are associated with 
lower advisory fees.23   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.3 Determinants of soft dollar fees and other measures of the investing costs of mutual funds 
In this subsection, we analyze the output of the Equation 3 estimations, that is, the potential 
determinants of soft dollar use (SDU), soft dollar fees (SoftFee), brokerage fees (BrkFee), 
turnover (Turn), and the turnover cost (TurnCost), reported in Table 6. As before, we focus on 
 
22 The positive association between turnover and advisory fees is consistent with the findings of Deli (2002). 
23 Excluding the governance variables does not change the signs, magnitude, and significance of the remaining 
variables’ coefficients. 
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the results that hold consistently between Panel A (all funds) and Panel B (funds with net assets 
over $50mln).  
Among the variables for the broker’s participation and contracting environment – 
research, sales, alternative compensation (loads and 12b-1 fees), concentration, affiliation, and 
credit – only the research dummy is significant in both panels in one of the regressions: it is 
associated with a lower turnover. The larger funds tend to have lower total brokerage fees, soft 
dollar commissions, and turnover costs, likely because of economies of scale (consistent with 
Livingston and O’Neal 1996). Higher turnover is associated with higher total and soft dollar 
commissions (SoftFee and BrkFee) but not a higher share of soft dollars in the commission 
structure (SDU).  
When it comes to the fund’s governance, the board’s independence is associated with 
lower turnover costs and lower soft dollar commissions (marginally for the entire sample). The 
boards with higher median tenures of directors are associated with lower soft dollar commissions 
and turnover. Thus, the shareholders might benefit from the experience of the directors who have 
been on the fund’s board for a longer period and are more familiar with the fund. The boards 
with a higher percentage of directors with finance backgrounds (Fin) are associated with higher 
cost measures (SoftFee, BrkFee, and TurnCost) but not with higher turnover. One possible 
explanation is that the presence of directors with finance backgrounds might exacerbate agency 
conflicts: the boards can have their interests aligned more with the interests of the managers than 
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with the shareholders.24 More highly compensated boards are associated with higher soft dollar 
use and slightly lower turnover.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Our governance results suggest that agency conflicts might be exacerbated and investors 
might be worse off when a significant proportion of the fund’s directors have a finance 
background. Whether that is the case is a question we leave to future research.  
 
6 Conclusion 
The bundling of services under soft dollar arrangements could possibly benefit mutual funds’ 
shareholders if it results in better risk-adjusted returns and/or lower advisory fees. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the shareholder wealth is reduced through the use of soft dollar 
arrangements. The results of our study tend to support the latter conjecture.  
Our study is the first one to use actual hand-collected soft dollar and total brokerage 
commission figures for a large number of actively managed mutual funds. Controlling for a 
variety of factors, we find that higher soft dollar and total brokerage commissions are associated 
with lower risk-adjusted returns based on the four-factor model and the higher advisory fees of 
mutual funds. The bundling or unbundling of commissions is not as important as the amount of 
commissions paid relative to the fund’s size, turnover, and the turnover costs. While it is possible 
 
24 In a recent study, Fricke (2014) reports that more highly compensated fund boards and boards with lower fund 
holdings are associated with lower turnover of underperforming funds’ managers, consistent with the agency costs 
explanation. 
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that research paid for by soft dollars is superior, its quality is likely not homogenous across 
providers, and its costs tend to outweigh its benefits to shareholders. 
The second contribution of our study is in examining soft dollars and other measures of 
the investing costs of mutual funds in a governance context. The characteristics that the literature 
associates with higher quality boards do not seem to unambiguously benefit the mutual funds’ 
shareholders. On the one hand, larger boards and more highly compensated boards are associated 
with lower advisory fees and brokerage commissions. In addition, boards with higher median 
tenure of directors are associated with lower soft dollar fees and turnover. On the other hand, 
more highly compensated boards are associated with higher soft dollar fees and boards with 
higher proportions of directors with finance backgrounds are associated with higher advisory 
fees, soft dollar commissions, and total brokerage commissions, as well as higher turnover costs 
for a portfolio. Therefore, it is possible that high proportions of directors with finance 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics. This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the 
study. The sample represents annual data from 1999 through 2003 for a random selection of actively 







All Funds (391 funds) 
 Funds with Net Assets over 
$50mln (304 funds) 
Variable definition Mnemonic N  Mean Median St. Dev.  N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Four-factor Adjusted Return, %  FFAR 1,466 -0.98 -1.57 14.04  1,070 -0.60 -1.42 13.88 
Soft $ / Total Brokerage, % SDU 1,571 44.9 33.4 36.8  1,152 46.6 35.2 37.4 
Soft $ / TNA, bps SoftFee 1,571 18.6 6.8 33.9  1,152 17.7 6.1 33.6 
Brokerage Fee / TNA, bps BrkFee 1,571 41.9 22.8 57.6  1,152 34.4 20.3 44.9 
Turnover Turn 1,566 3.13 2.03 4.80  1,150 2.44 1.87 2.38 
Cost to turn over portfolio, bps TurnCost 1,566 16.1 12.7 22.1  1,150 14.9 12.4 15.33 
Advisory Fee / TNA, bps AdvFee 1,565 78.0 75.5 31.4  1,147 76.3 73.0 32.1 
Fund Size, $ million FundSize 1,571 724 166 1,833  1,152 979 313 2,083 
Adviser size, $ million AdvSize 1,468 82,495 21,092 161,495  1,088 86,020 24,847 174,246 
Number of accounts Accts 1,537 60,216 7,530 199,843  1,123 81,693 16,327 230,116 
Reimbursement, % Reimb 1,562 19.2 1.2 70.2  1,143 6.0 0.3 19.7 
Objective Concentration ObjConcntr 1,556 21.9 22.1 7.9  1,139 22.0 22.1 7.8 
Number of board seats Seats 1,566 8.8 9.0 3.1  1,149 8.9 9.0 3.1 
% of independent directors Indep 1,566 75.2 75.0 12.7  1,149 75.1 75.0 13.6 
Median tenure of directors, yrs. MedTenure 1,566 6.3 6.0 4.1  1,149 6.7 6.0 4.2 




































Aggregate lagged director 

















Front-end load+12b-1, bps AltComp 1,521 15.9 0.0 50.3  1,110 16.3 0.6 49.4 
Brokerage Herfindahl, % BrConcntr 1,543 11.7 8.2 11.1  1,130 11.1 7.7 10.6 
Research (dummy) Research 1,550 0.886    1,131 0.886   
Sales of fund shares (dummy) Sales 1,549 0.322    1,131 0.349   
Affiliated broker (dummy) Aff 1,554 0.287    1,136 0.289   
Arrangement to return 











Table 2 Correlations. This table presents correlations between key variables employed in the study. FFAR 
is the four-factor model alpha (stands for the four-factor adjusted return), in percent, SoftFee is the 
proportion of total net assets paid as bundled (soft dollar) commissions, in basis points, BrkFee is the 
proportion of total net assets paid as total brokerage commissions, in basis points, SDU is the ratio of soft 
dollar commissions to total brokerage commissions (SoftFee/BrkFee), in %, Fund Size is the fund’s total 
net assets in a given year (the average of the twelve monthly net asset figures), Turn is turnover (total 
sales and purchases divided by total net assets), in decimals, AdvFee is the gross advisory fee divided by 
total net assets, in basis points, and TurnCost is the cost of turning over the portfolio once (BrkFee/Turn), 
in basis points. 
 
Panel A: All Funds  
 FFAR SoftFee BrkFee SDU Fund Size Turn AdvFee 
FFAR        
SoftFee -0.08***       
BrkFee -0.14***  0.64***      
SDU  0.05*  0.47*** -0.00     
Fund Size  0.07** -0.08*** -0.15*** 0.09***    
Turn -0.07**  0.24***  0.65*** -0.07*** -0.11***   
AdvFee -0.06**  0.18***  0.26*** -0.06** -0.19***  0.15***  
TurnCost -0.08***  0.16***  0.25*** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.08***  -0.01 
 
 
Panel B: Funds with Net Assets over $50mln  
 FFAR SoftFee BrkFee SDU Fund Size Turn AdvFee 
FFAR        
SoftFee -0.12***       
BrkFee -0.22***  0.77***      
SDU  0.05*  0.47***  0.09***     
Fund Size  0.07** -0.09*** -0.15***  0.09***    
Turn -0.09***  0.39***  0.62***  0.02 -0.12***   
AdvFee -0.06**  0.20***  0.32*** -0.06** -0.19***  0.22***  
TurnCost -0.16***  0.24***  0.35*** -0.01 -0.10*** -0.05 -0.08*** 
 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 Decile Means. This table presents the means of key variables corresponding to the lowest and highest deciles of 
each of these variables. Decile ranks are in parentheses next to the means. The diagonal is bolded because it represents 
decile means for the variables themselves, thus the decile ranks are always 1 and 10 on the diagonal. For example, in the 
left upper corner the mean FFAR is -0.254 (-25.4%) for the lowest FFAR decile and 0.265 (26.5%) for the top decile. 
Moving to the right, the mean SoftFee for fund-years in the lowest FFAR decile is 40.1 basis points, which is the highest 
SoftFee mean across all FFAR deciles (the rank is 10); the mean SoftFee for fund-years in the highest FFAR decile is 
26.7 basis points, which is the second highest across all FFAR deciles (the rank is 9). FFAR is the four-factor model 
alpha (stands for the four-factor adjusted return), in percent, SoftFee is the proportion of total net assets paid as bundled 
(soft dollar) commissions, in basis points, BrkFee is the proportion of total net assets paid as total brokerage 
commissions, in basis points, SDU is the ratio of soft dollar commissions to total brokerage commissions 
(SoftFee/BrkFee), in %, TNA is the total net assets, Turn is turnover (total sales and purchases divided by total net 
assets), in decimals, and AdvFee is the gross advisory fee divided by total net assets, in basis points. 
 
Panel A: All Funds 
Decile Rank FFAR SoftFee, bps BrkFee, bps SDU, % TNA, $mln Turn AdvFee, bps 
        
Low FFAR -0.254 (1) 40.1 (10) 81.4 (10) 49.4 (9) 282 (1) 4.51 (10) 88.2 (10) 
High FFAR 0.265 (10) 26.7 (9) 47.2 (8) 55.7 (10) 767 (5) 3.22 (7) 77.1 (6) 
Difference 0.519*** -13.4** -34.2*** 6.3 485*** -1.29** -11.1*** 
         
Low SoftFee -0.007 (5) 0.2 (1) 19.6 (1) 3.4 (1) 897 (4) 1.79 (1) 73.7 (1) 
High SoftFee -0.044 (1) 94.4 (10) 119.5 (10) 84.2 (10) 305 (1) 6.00 (10) 93.5 (10) 
Difference -0.037* 94.2*** 99.9*** 80.8*** -593***  4.21*** 19.8*** 
        
Low BrkFee 0.030 (10) 1.7 (1) 4.3 (1) 37.7 (1) 1,351 (2) 1.09 (1) 68.2 (1) 
High BrkFee -0.042 (2) 69.3 (10) 172.9 (10) 42.4 (3)   172 (10) 11.51 (10) 103.7 (10) 
Difference -0.072*** 67.7*** 168.6*** 4.7 -1,179*** 10.42*** 35.5*** 
        
Low SDU -0.036 (1) 0.5 (1) 47.8 (8) 0.9 (1) 582 (2) 3.23 (6) 80.9 (8) 
High SDU -0.012 (4) 39.7 (9) 40.4 (6) 98.5 (10) 799 (8) 2.42 (2) 86.4 (10) 
Difference 0.024 39.2 -7.4 97.6*** 217 -0.80** 5.5* 
        
Low TNA -0.035 (1) 15.1 (5) 42.6 (6) 36.0 (1) 8 (1) 2.80 (7) 81.2 (4) 
High TNA 0.022 (10) 10.5 (1) 17.3 (1) 55.4 (10) 4,934 (10) 1.89 (1) 59.6 (1) 
Difference 0.058*** -4.6* -25.3*** 19.4*** 4,926*** -0.91** -21.6*** 
        
Low Turn -0.017 (4) 3.0 (1) 10.3 (1) 34.4 (1) 1,175 (9) 0.48 (1) 68.6 (1) 
High Turn -0.029 (2) 54.2 (10) 139.1 (10) 40.2 (2)    351 (2) 13.07 (10) 96.1 (10) 
Difference -0.013 51.2*** 128.8*** 5.7 -824*** 12.60*** 27.5*** 
        
Low AdvFee 0.005 (9) 6.7 (2) 27.1 (2) 35.5 (4) 1,918 (10) 1.62 (1) 39.6 (1) 
High AdvFee -0.021 (4) 38.2 (10) 79.2 (10) 42.2 (5)    177 (1) 3.43 (8) 135.2 (10) 





Table 3 (continued) 
 
***, **, * denote significant difference between decile means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
(for a two-tailed t-test assuming equal variances). 
 
 
    
  
Panel B: Funds with Net Assets over $50mln  
Decile Rank FFAR SoftFee, bps BrkFee, bps SDU, % TNA, $mln Turn AdvFee, bps 
        
Low FFAR -0.239 (1) 41.3 (10) 80.4 (10) 50.3 (8) 429 (1) 3.80 (10) 89.1 (10) 
High FFAR 0.272 (10) 20.1 (9) 32.0 (7) 58.9 (10) 1,056 (5) 2.68 (9) 75.2 (6) 
Difference 0.511*** -21.2*** -48.4*** 8.7 626*** -1.11*** -13.9*** 
         
Low SoftFee 0.009 (10) 0.1 (1) 18.1 (2) 3.3 (1) 959 (4) 1.67 (1) 69.6 (1) 
High SoftFee -0.051 (1) 92.2 (10) 111.7 (10) 87.2 (10) 417 (1) 4.77 (10) 93.6 (10) 
Difference -0.060*** 92.1*** 93.6*** 83.8 -542*** 3.09*** 24.0*** 
        
Low BrkFee 0.026 (10) 1.4 (1) 3.7 (1) 37.4 (1) 1,482 (8) 1.04 (1) 67.2 (1) 
High BrkFee -0.053 (2) 74.1 (10) 137.7 (10) 54.3 (10)    332 (1) 5.91 (10) 106.0 (10) 
Difference -0.079*** 72.7*** 134.0*** 17.0*** -1,150*** 4.87*** 38.8*** 
        
Low SDU -0.039 (1) 0.4 (1) 38.4 (8) 0.8 (1)     786 (2) 2.79 (9) 73.9 (5) 
High SDU -0.009 (3) 39.3 (9) 39.9 (9) 98.5 (10) 1,063 (7) 2.41 (5) 83.9 (10) 
Difference  0.031 38.9*** 1.6 97.7***     277 -0.37 10.0*** 
        
Low TNA -0.035 (1) 26.4 (10) 54.7 (10) 46.3 (5) 61 (1) 3.53 (10) 89.1 (10) 
High TNA 0.039 (10) 8.9 (1) 15.1 (1) 54.6 (9) 6,002 (10) 1.79 (1) 58.6 (1) 
Difference 0.073*** -17.5*** -39.6*** 8.2 5,941*** -1.74*** -30.5*** 
        
Low Turn -0.022 (3) 2.7 (1) 8.3 (1) 35.3 (1) 1,466 (10) 0.45 (1) 68.8 (1) 
High Turn -0.054 (1) 57.3 (10) 108.3 (10) 48.5 (7)    608 (2) 7.51 (10) 97.1 (10) 
Difference -0.032* 54.6*** 100.0*** 13.1**   -858*** 7.05*** 28.2*** 
        
Low AdvFee 0.001 (9) 5.7 (1) 17.6 (1) 38.0 (3) 2,098 (10) 1.65 (1) 39.4 (1) 
High AdvFee -0.020 (4) 42.5 (10) 82.1 (10) 43.7 (5)    276 (1) 3.41 (10) 133.6 (10) 
Difference -0.021 36.8*** 64.5*** 5.6 -1,822*** 1.75*** 94.3*** 
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Table 4 Panel Regressions of Risk-adjusted Fund Returns. The dependent variable is the annualized alpha 
from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (the four-factor adjusted return, FFAR), in percent. SDU is the 
ratio of soft dollar commissions to total brokerage commissions (SoftFee/BrkFee), in %, SoftFee is the 
proportion of total net assets paid as bundled (soft dollar) commissions, in basis points, BrkFee is the 
proportion of total net assets paid as total brokerage commissions, in basis points, Turn is turnover (total 
sales and purchases divided by total net assets), in decimals, TurnCost is the cost of turning over the 
portfolio once (BrkFee/Turn), in basis points, and FundSize is the average of twelve monthly total net 
assets figures, in thousands of dollars. Objective and year fixed effects are included. Fund and time 






Panel A: All Funds 
Variable Reg [1] Reg [2] Reg [3] Reg [4] Reg [5] Reg [6] Reg [7] 
Intercept 1.51  2.06  5.64  1.58 8.45**  2.17 9.64** 
 [0.34] [0.46] [1.25] [0.35] [1.98] [0.49] [2.21] 
SDU 0.02       
 [1.38]       
SoftFee  -0.06***    -0.06***  
  [-2.97]    [-2.95]  
BrkFee   -0.06***     
   [-5.28]     
Turn    -0.07  -0.05 -0.25*** 
    [-0.72]  [-0.61] [-2.76] 
TurnCost     -0.33***  -0.35*** 
     [-7.67]  [-7.96] 
Ln(FundSizet-1) 0.11  0.08 -0.14  0.12 -0.10  0.07 -0.16 
 [0.52] [0.36] [-0.65] [0.55] [-0.43] [0.30] [-0.74] 
Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj. R2 5.7% 7.0% 9.3% 5.4% 12.2% 6.8% 12.6% 
F-stat 5.24*** 6.30*** 8.23*** 4.96*** 10.72*** 5.77*** 10.45*** 
N (funds) 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 
N (fund-yrs.) 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 




Panel B: Funds with Net Assets over $50mln 
Variable Reg [1] Reg [2] Reg [3] Reg [4] Reg [5] Reg [6] Reg [7] 
Intercept 7.70   8.88 15.22* 8.95 16.75***  9.89 18.64** 
 [0.97] [1.14] [1.89] [1.08] [2.77] [1.22] [2.36] 
SDU 0.02       
 [1.30]       
SoftFee   -0.06***    -0.05***  
  [-2.60]    [-2.82]  
BrkFee   -0.08***     
   [-5.95]     
Turn    -0.68*  -0.52* -0.69** 
    [-1.87]  [-1.67] [-2.49] 
TurnCost     -0.37***  -0.37*** 
     [-6.76]  [-6.90] 
Ln(FundSizet-1) -0.36 -0.44 -0.81** -0.36 -0.68* -0.46 -0.75** 
 [-0.94] [-1.17] [-2.20] [-0.96] [-1.86] [-1.24] [-2.04] 
Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj. R2 8.0% 9.3% 13.4% 8.2% 14.9% 9.3% 15.6% 
F-stat 5.55*** 6.34*** 9.13*** 5.68*** 10.17*** 6.01*** 10.04*** 
N (funds) 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
N (fund-years) 865 864 864 864 864 864 864 
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Table 5 Panel Regressions of Advisory Fee. The dependent variable is AdvFee, the gross advisory fee 
divided by fund size, in basis points. SDU is the ratio of soft dollar commissions to total brokerage 
commissions (SoftFee/BrkFee), in %, SoftFee is the proportion of assets paid as soft dollar commission, 
in basis points, BrkFee is the proportion of total net assets paid as total brokerage commissions, in basis 
points, Turn is fund turnover in decimals, TurnCost is the cost of turning over the portfolio once 
(BrkFee/Turn), in basis points, FundSize is the average of twelve monthly total net assets figures, in 
thousands of dollars, AdvSize is the adviser size (assets under management in $ million), Accts is the 
number of shareholder accounts with the adviser, in thousands, Reimb is the reimbursement from the fund 
to the shareholders divided by the total net assets, in basis points, ObjConcntr is concentration of funds in 
a given investment objective measured by the normalized Herfindahl index. The last five variables are 
related to fund governance: Indep is the percentage of independent directors on the board, Seats is the 
number of seats on the board, MedTenure is the median tenure of fund directors, in years, Fin is the 
percentage of fund directors with finance background, OtherDir is the percentage of the board directors 
who have at least one directorship outside of the fund family, and Compenst-1 is the average compensation 
of the fund directors lagged one year, in $ thousand. Objective and year fixed effects are included. Fund 






Panel A: All Funds 
Variable Reg [1] Reg [2] Reg [3] Reg [4] Reg [5] Reg [6] Reg [7] 
Intercept 108.95*** 105.42*** 101.22*** 107.11*** 119.96***  103.25*** 116.87*** 
 [8.95] [8.91] [8.73] [8.65] [10.53] [8.66] [10.12] 
SDU 0.04*       
 [1.87]       
SoftFee  0.11***     0.11***  
  [5.14]    [4.80]  
BrkFee   0.07***     
   [3.63]     
Turn     0.47***   0.35**  0.38** 
    [3.13]  [2.35] [2.49] 
TurnCost     -0.20**  -0.18** 
     [-2.17]  [-1.98] 
Ln(FundSize) -3.22*** -2.86*** -2.62*** -3.12*** -3.68*** -2.75*** -3.51*** 
 [-4.36] [-4.00] [-3.67] [-4.11] [-5.17] [-3.82] [-4.89] 
Ln(AdvSize) -0.30 -0.44 -0.51 -0.42 -0.64 -0.53 -0.72 
 [-0.50]] [-0.76] [-0.86] [-0.68] [-1.05] [-0.89] [-1.19] 
Ln(Accounts)  0.80***  0.77***  0.81***  0.88***  0.97***  0.80***  1.00*** 
 [3.03] [2.94] [3.17] [3.34] [3.58] [3.03] [3.69] 
Reimb  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
 [1.10] [1.07] [1.02] [1.22] [1.36] [1.12] [1.40] 
ObjConcntr  0.12*  0.11  0.14**  0.15**  0.13*  0.12*  0.15** 
 [1.81] [1.54] [2.06] [2.17] [1.94] [1.79] [2.19] 
Indep  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.05 
 [0.93] [1.10] [0.83] [0.67] [0.76] [0.97] [0.64] 
Seats -0.91*** -0.83*** -0.84*** -0.74*** -0.86*** -0.77*** -0.79*** 
 [-3.63] [-3.62] [-3.73] [-3.20] [-3.56] [-3.30] [-3.23] 
MedTenure  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.03 -0.04  0.10 -0.02 
 [0.11] [0.67] [0.37] [0.26] [-0.27] [0.76] [-0.12] 
Fin  0.14**  0.12*  0.13*  0.16**  0.15**  0.12*  0.15** 
 [1.97] [1.71] [1.79] [2.17] [2.09] [1.81] [2.17] 
OtherDir -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-1.09] [-0.74] [-0.42] [-0.53] [-0.83] [-0.33] [-0.35] 
Compenst-1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05** -0.04** 
 [-2.67] [-2.83] [-2.35] [-2.38] [-2.47] [-2.44] [-2.50] 
Obj. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj. R2 8.4% 10.7% 10.6% 8.4% 9.8% 11.0% 10.1% 
F-stat 6.02*** 7.55*** 7.49*** 5.98*** 6.91*** 7.47*** 6.88*** 
N (funds) 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 
N (fund-yrs.) 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 
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Table 5 (continued)   
 
Panel B: Funds with Net Assets over $50mln 
Variable Reg [1] Reg [2] Reg [3] Reg [4] Reg [5] Reg [6] Reg [7] 
Intercept 135.55*** 128.58*** 122.13*** 131.46*** 144.18*** 125.04*** 139.17*** 
 [8.90] [8.80] [8.86] [8.83] [10.42] [8.62] [10.13] 
SDU 0.01       
 [0.67]       
SoftFee  0.11***    0.11***  
  [4.86]    [4.66]  
BrkFee   0.11***     
   [4.96]     
Turn    0.78**    0.68**  0.79** 
    [2.21]  [1.98] [2.13] 
TurnCost     -0.10  -0.08 
     [-0.95]  [-0.81] 
Ln(FundSize) -5.02*** -4.41*** -4.06*** -4.76*** -5.40*** -4.20*** -5.09*** 
 [-5.41] [-4.96] [-4.67] [-5.07] [-6.00] [-4.66] [-5.56] 
Ln(AdvSize) -0.02 -0.14 -0.21 -0.09 -0.24 -0.22 -0.33 
 [-0.03] [-0.19] [-0.29] [-0.12] [-0.32] [-0.29] [-0.45] 
Ln(Accounts)  1.12***  1.05***  1.08***  1.11***  1.23***  1.04***  1.22*** 
 [3.05] [2.94] [3.11] [3.04] [3.34] [2.93] [3.32] 
Reimb  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03 
 [0.78] [0.44] [0.56] [0.88] [1.00] [0.57]  [1.08] 
ObjConcntr  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.05 
 [0.58] [0.29] [0.61] [0.74] [0.55] [0.45] [0.71] 
Indep  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00 
 [0.12] [0.34] [0.22] [0.00] [0.04] [0.26] [0.03] 
Seats -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.91*** -0.77*** -0.94*** -0.81*** -0.89*** 
 [-3.42] [-3.53] [-3.82] [-3.19] [-3.68] [-3.36] [-3.50] 
MedTenure -0.01  0.04  0.04  0.02 -0.04  0.06  0.02 
 [-0.05] [0.33] [0.30] [0.12] [-0.29] [0.45] [0.13] 
Fin 0.16** 0.14**  0.12*  0.16**  0.16**  0.14**  0.16** 
 [2.25] [2.08] [1.81] [2.28] [2.27] [2.12] [2.30] 
OtherDir -0.01 -0.01  0.01  -0.00 -0.01  0.00  0.01 
 [-0.34] [-0.18] [0.19] [-0.06] [-0.16] [0.07] [0.16] 
Compenst-1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 [-2.87] [-3.13] [-2.77] [-2.81] [-2.76] [-3.09] [-2.73] 
Obj. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj. R2 9.3% 12.0% 14.1% 9.6% 10.6% 12.3% 11.2% 
F-stat 5.14*** 6.55*** 7.65*** 5.29*** 5.83*** 6.51*** 5.95*** 
N (funds) 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 
N (fund-yrs.) 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel Regressions of Cost of Investing Measures. The dependent variable is one of the following: 
SDU – the ratio of soft dollar commissions to total brokerage commissions (SoftFee/BrkFee), in %, 
SoftFee – the proportion of assets paid as soft dollar commission, in basis points, BrkFee – the proportion 
of total net assets paid as total brokerage commissions, in basis points, Turn – fund turnover in decimals, 
or TurnCost – the cost of turning over the portfolio once (BrkFee/Turn), in basis points. The independent 
variables which do not serve as dependent variables in different versions of the regression are: Research – 
a dummy variable equal to one if receipt of investment research and statistical information is a 
consideration for broker participation, Sales – a dummy variable equal to one if sales of fund’s shares is a 
consideration for broker participation, AltComp – the proportion of total net assets received by brokers or 
dealers as part of total front-end load and 12b-1 fee, in basis points, BrConcntr – the fund’s brokerage 
service concentration measured by Herfindahl index, Aff – a dummy variable equal to one if any broker or 
dealer is affiliated with the adviser, Cred – a dummy variable equal to one if there is an arrangement to 
return or credit part of total commissions or profits by at least one broker to the fund adviser, FundSize – 
the average of twelve monthly total net assets figures, in thousands of dollars, AdvSize is the adviser size 
(assets under management in $ million), Accts is the number of shareholder accounts with the adviser, in 
thousands, Reimb is the reimbursement from the fund to the shareholders divided by the total net assets, 
in basis points, ObjConcntr is concentration of funds in a given investment objective measured by the 
normalized Herfindahl index. The last five independent variables are related to fund governance: Indep is 
the percentage of independent directors on the board, Seats is the number of seats on the board, 
MedTenure is the median tenure of fund directors, in years, Fin is the percentage of fund directors with 
finance background, OtherDir is the percentage of the board directors who have at least one directorship 
outside of the fund family, and Compenst-1 is the average compensation of the fund directors lagged one 
year, in thousands of dollars. Objective and year fixed effects are included. Fund and time subscripts are 









Panel A: All Funds 
Variable SDU SoftFee BrkFee Turn TurnCost 
Intercept  7.01  23.92 82.37*** 5.40*** 32.97*** 
 [0.76] [1.33] [3.67] [4.83] [7.38] 
Research  2.09  1.91 1.50 -2.01*** -1.23 
 [0.75] [0.67] [0.62] [-4.23] [-0.73] 
Sales  3.90 -0.62 2.62  0.23** -0.07 
 [1.54] [-0.25] [0.75] [2.02] [-0.23] 
AltComp  0.03  0.06* 0.06* -0.00 -0.00 
 [0.86] [1.91] [1.82] [-0.22] [-0.46] 
BrConcntr  0.07 -0.03 -0.10**  0.00 -0.04 
 [1.29] [-0.88] [-2.35] [0.48] [-1.02] 
Aff  1.13  1.09 -4.46  -0.30 -1.73* 
 [0.72] [0.58] [-1.45] [-0.33] [-1.87] 
Cred  0.58 -0.76  6.77 -0.06 -0.79 
 [0.64] [-0.30] [1.48] [-0.53] [-0.46] 
Ln(FundSize) -0.07 -2.40*** -6.16*** -0.13 -1.30*** 
 [-0.25] [-2.67] [-4.55] [-1.38] [-6.04] 
Ln(AdvSize) -1.60*  0.29 -0.59  -0.11* -0.86*** 
 [-1.75] [0.43] [-0.24] [-1.78] [-2.92] 
Ln(Accounts)  1.03***  1.03***  1.60 -0.08** 0.51*** 
 [2.84] [2.66] [1.35] [-1.98] [3.73] 
Reimb  0.03*  0.04* 0.03** -0.00 0.06 
 [1.76] [1.82] [2.09] [-0.79] [0.70] 
ObjConcntr  0.20*  0.23* -0.00 -0.00 0.04 
 [1.84] [1.86] [-0.18] [-0.47] [1.56] 
Turn -0.80***  0.99** 6.68***  -0.50*** 
 [-3.31] [2.52] [9.57]  [-4.95] 
Indep -0.15* -0.17* -0.19 0.01** -0.08*** 
 [-1.95] [-1.84] [-1.00] [2.15] [-2.84] 
Seats  0.06 -0.31  0.13 -0.10***  -0.09 
 [0.18] [-0.87] [0.72] [-4.10] [-0.69] 
MedTenure -0.02 -0.67*** -0.28 -0.06*** -0.15** 
 [-0.33] [-3.58] [-1.11] [-3.44] [2.44] 
Fin  0.16**  0.21***  0.34*** -0.08  0.09*** 
 [2.30] [2.70] [2.86] [-1.55] [2.97] 
OtherDir  0.08  0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.00 
 [1.18] [0.24] [-0.22] [-3.59] [-0.51] 
Compenst-1  0.11***  0.05** -0.01 -0.01***  0.01 
 [4.19] [2.08] [-0.33] [-3.28] [0.30] 
Obj. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 11.6% 9.3% 33.8% 23.6% 31.3% 
F-stat 6.52*** 5.31*** 22.53*** 14.43*** 20.24*** 
N (funds) 362 362 362 362 362 


















































***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B:  Funds with Net Assets over $50mln 
Variable SDU SoftFee BrkFee Turn TurnCost 
Intercept  57.76***  64.75*** 98.13***  4.27*** 36.74*** 
 [3.98] [4.25] [3.92] [3.04] [6.56] 
Research  1.34  1.32 3.42 -0.78** -0.68 
 [0.09] [0.45] [0.83] [-2.33] [-0.29] 
Sales 5.64** -1.25 -1.38  0.05 -0.58 
 [1.97] [-0.53] [-0.48] [0.32] [-0.55] 
AltComp  0.02  0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.00 
 [0.29] [0.29] [0.75] [0.15] [-1.23] 
BrConcntr -0.05 -0.03 -0.09  0.02 -0.04 
 [-1.29] [-1.59] [-1.38] [1.01] [-1.48] 
Aff  -2.13 -1.99 -5.78*  -0.15 -1.61 
 [-0.74] [-0.70] [-1.86] [-0.49] [-1.46] 
Cred  3.31  0.01  7.13 0.08 -1.59 
 [1.33] [0.30] [1.52] [1.05] [-1.41] 
Ln(FundSize) -3.60* -5.37*** -7.27*** -0.27* -1.83*** 
 [-1.80] [-5.67] [-4.87] [-1.79] [-5.65] 
Ln(AdvSize) -1.30  -0.25 -0.16  0.08 -0.56*** 
 [-0.94] [-0.61] [-0.29] [1.27] [-2.62] 
Ln(Accounts)  1.58***  1.26***  1.11  0.02 0.59*** 
 [3.32] [3.14] [1.23] [0.90] [3.48] 
Reimb  -0.02  0.06* 0.09* -0.01 -0.00 
 [-0.54] [1.91] [1.77] [-1.32] [-0.35] 
ObjConcntr  0.10  0.22 0.06 -0.00 0.02 
 [0.46] [1.52] [0.45] [-1.24] [0.91] 
Turn -1.07**  1.05 5.84***  -0.43** 
 [-2.11] [1.44] [3.96]  [-1.99] 
Indep -0.26*** -0.21** -0.20* 0.01 -0.07** 
 [-2.90] [-2.06] [-1.80] [1.55] [-2.16] 
Seats  0.01 -0.30  0.13 -0.05** -0.17 
 [0.05] [-0.68] [0.48] [-2.17] [-0.12] 
MedTenure -0.01 -0.51*** -0.30 -0.03** -0.10 
 [-0.17] [-3.15] [-1.26] [-2.02] [-1.47] 
Fin  0.11  0.16**  0.33***  -0.00  0.08*** 
 [1.49] [2.17] [2.74] [-0.05] [2.70] 
OtherDir  0.13**  0.03 -0.05 -0.01***  -0.00 
 [2.28] [0.75] [-0.58] [-2.74] [-0.39] 
Compenst-1  0.08**  0.04*  0.00 -0.00**  0.01 
 [2.19] [1.80] [0.68] [-1.97] [0.45] 
Obj. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 13.0% 12.0% 25.3% 7.1% 32.7% 
F-stat 5.67*** 5.25*** 11.58*** 3.47*** 16.14*** 
N (funds) 286 286 286 286 286 
N (fund-years) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
